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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-
3(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that Plaintiff was not entitled to notice 
pursuant to Rule 4-506, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration,1 where Plaintiffs attorney 
filed a notice of withdrawal but did not obtain court approval therefor after the trial court 
indicated its intention to grant summary judgment but before the trial court entered an 
order granting summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents only a question of law. This court reviews the 
trial court's determinations of law for correctness. 
2. Did the trial court correctly determine that the judgment in this matter should not 
be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, where Plaintiff was 
aware that the judgment could be entered at any time and knew that the entry of the 
judgment would trigger the period of time in which Plaintiff could file an appeal but 
nevertheless failed to check with the court for more than four months to determine if the 
judgment had been entered and failed to notify the trial court or Union Pacific that 
Plaintiff had changed his address. 
1
 Rule 4-506 has since been repealed effective November 1, 2003. Withdrawal of 
counsel is now governed under Rule 74, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Standard of Review: This Court has recently reiterated "[a] trial court has discretion in 
determining whether a movant has shown [Rule 60(b) grounds], and this court will 
reverse the trial court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion." Franklin 
Covey Client Sales. Inc. v. Melvin, 2 P.3d 451, U 9 (Utah App. 2000), quoting Ostler v. 
Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, L. Earl Hawley ("Plaintiff') is an attorney, licensed to 
practice law in the State of Nevada. (R. 211.) Plaintiff seeks recovery from Union 
Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific") for injuries he alleges he sustained while he 
was driving without permission on Union Pacific's right-of-way when he drove into 
section of a dirt road that Plaintiff alleges was washed out by a recent storm. (R. 003-006 
ffif 4-5; R. 169-170.) In this appeal, Plaintiff asks this Court to set aside the judgment 
entered by the trial court. 
2. Statement of Facts, 
The underlying facts pertaining to Plaintiffs appeal are not genuinely in dispute. 
Union Pacific believes that Plaintiffs factual statement is incomplete in certain respects, 
and therefore provides the following factual background. 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action on December 1, 2000. (R. 003-0006.) 
In his Complaint, Plaintiff listed his address as 815 South Fourth Street, Las Vegas, 
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Nevada, 89101. (R. 003.) 
In March of 2003, Union Pacific filed a motion for summary judgment in this 
case. (R. 069.) The trial court heard oral argument regarding Union Pacific's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on June 10, 2003. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court 
indicated that it would grant Union Pacific's motion and directed Union Pacific to 
prepare an Order of Summary Judgment within thirty days to submit for entry by the 
court. (R. 152.) 
On or about, June 19, 2003, Plaintiffs former counsel, Karl Mueller, filed a 
Notice of Withdrawal of Attorney. (R. 155-156.) Mr. Mueller did not request, and the 
Court did not grant, approval of the withdrawal. (R. 212.) According to the mailing 
certificate attached to that notice, Mr. Mueller sent a copy of the notice to Plaintiff, listing 
Plaintiffs address on the mailing certificate at 916 Casino Center Boulevard, Las Vegas, 
Nevada, 89101. As noted by the trial court, no effort was made to alert Union Pacific to 
the fact that this was a new address for Plaintiff. (R. 212.) 
At no time did Plaintiff or his attorney file a notice with the court or Union Pacific 
that the address Plaintiff listed in his Complaint was no longer the address at which the 
court or Union Pacific could contact Plaintiff. As of June 16,2003, Union Pacific had 
not yet submitted the order on the trial court's ruling to Plaintiffs counsel for approval, 
as required at the time under Rule 4-504, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, nor to 
the court, and the court had not yet entered an order on Union Pacific's motion. 
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On June 27,2003, in response to Mr. Mueller's notice of withdrawal, Union 
Pacific filed a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel (the "First Notice to Appear"). (R. 
157-158.) Defendant sent a copy of the First Notice to Appear to Plaintiff at the address 
provided by Plaintiff in his Complaint and to Plaintiffs counsel, Mr. Mueller. (R. 157-
158.) The First Notice to Appear was returned to Union Pacific with an indication by the 
postal service that it was undeliverable. (E.g., R. 194.) 
After the First Notice to Appear was returned, Union Pacific contacted Mr. 
Mueller, to inquire as to Plaintiffs address. (R. 193-194.) To the best of Union Pacific's 
knowledge,2 the address provided by Mr. Mueller or his office at which Union Pacific 
could contact Plaintiff was 918 Casino Center Blvd., Las Vegas, NV 89101. On July 15, 
2003, Union Pacific mailed a second Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel (the "Second 
Notice to Appear") to Plaintiff at 918 Casino Center Blvd, Las Vegas, Nevada, 89101 
and to Plaintiffs counsel, Karl Mueller. (R. 159 - 160.) 
As indicated in the Affidavit ofJeffery Peatross, filed in support of Plaintiff s 
motion, on August 8, 2003, Mr. Peatross contacted Union Pacific's counsel to inquire as 
to the status of the judgment, and specifically discussed whether the time in which to file 
a notice of appeal had begun. (R. 173-174.) During that conversation, Union Pacific's 
Based on subsequent events, it appears that the address was incorrect due to an error 
either on the part of Mr. Mueller or Union Pacific. Union Pacific would prefer to 
maintain that Mr. Mueller provided the incorrect address, but under the circumstances 
acknowledges the alternative possibility that a Union Pacific representative may have 
erroneously transcribed the address provided by Mr. Mueller or his office. 
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counsel explained that it had not yet filed the proposed judgment with the Court because 
it had been waiting for 20 days from when it submitted the Second Notice to Appear. (R. 
174.) According to Plaintiff, prior to the entry of judgment he personally contacted the 
Court's clerk to inquire as to the status of the case. (R. 169-172.) At that time, Plaintiff 
attests that he was advised that he did not need to be concerned about the time in which to 
appeal until the formal judgment was entered. (R. 169-172.) By corollary, Plaintiff was 
advised that the entry of judgment would trigger dates within which Plaintiff must file his 
appeal. 
Plaintiff claims that he did not make any further inquiries until August, 2003, 
when Mr. Peatross contacted the court to inquire on Plaintiffs behalf. (R. 169-172.) Mr. 
Peatross states that he was told that the judgment had not been entered at that time. (R. 
173-174.) As evidenced by his affidavit, his call to the court, and Mr. Peatross' call to 
the Court, Plaintiff was aware that judgment could be entered at any time, and that entry 
of judgment would trigger dates within which Plaintiff could appeal the court's decision. 
On August 11, 2003, Union Pacific submitted the proposed Judgment in this case. 
At that time, a copy of that proposed Judgment was mailed to Plaintiff at 918 Casino 
Center Blvd., Nevada, 89101. (R. 161-165.) On August 19, 2003, this Court entered the 
Judgment in Union Pacific's favor. (R. 161-165.) 
Plaintiff alleges that he did not receive a copy of the judgment because his correct 
address is 916 Casino Center Blvd., Las Vegas, Nevada. (R. 182.) Plaintiff alleges that 
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notwithstanding his knowledge that a judgment could be entered at any time which would 
trigger dates by which Plaintiff could appeal, he did not make any further effort to contact 
the court to inquire whether judgment had been entered until December, 2003, nearly 
four months after Mr. Peatross made the last inquiry regarding the status of the judgment. 
(R. 170-172.) When he inquired in December, 2002, Plaintiff was advised of the entry of 
judgment. (R. 170-172.) On January 12, 2004, Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside 
judgment, the denial of which he now appeals. (R. 167-168.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Because the Court's order had not yet been entered on Union Pacific's motion, 
Plaintiffs counsel was not entitled to withdraw without leave of court. As such Plaintiff 
was not entitled to notice under Rule 4-506, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Nevertheless, a notice to appear or appoint successor counsel was properly served on the 
only address provided by Plaintiff at which to reach him and served on his counsel. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to have the judgment set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved for unusual and 
exceptional circumstances. In addition, relief under that rule should not be granted unless 
the moving party has shown reasonable diligence to discover when the judgment is 
entered. 
This case is not an exceptional circumstance. To the extent Plaintiff did not 
receive express notice, it is because he failed to provide the Court or Union Pacific with 
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his current address. Knowing that a judgment could be entered at any time, Plaintiffs 
inexplicable lapse of approximately four months before inquiry as to the status of the 
judgment evidences a lack of reasonable diligence. The trial court's denial of Plaintiff s 
Motion for Relief from Judgment should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Plaintiff was served with all notices to which he is entitled. 
As of the time of events at issue in Plaintiffs appeal, Rule 4-506, Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration, governed withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. That 
rule provides that an attorney may withdraw as counsel of record only upon approval of 
the court when a motion has been filed and the court has not issued an order on the 
motion. The rule specifically states "under these circumstances, an attorney may not 
withdrawal except upon motion and order of the court." As noted by the trial court in its 
Memorandum Opinion dated March 2, 2004, Plaintiffs original attorney, Floyd Holm, 
never filed any notice of withdrawal nor substitution with the court. Plaintiffs other 
counsel, Mr. Mueller, did not obtain an order allowing him to withdrawal as counsel. 
The court found that Mr. Mueller was not entitled to withdraw simply by filing notice 
because, although the court had indicated its intention to do so, the court had not yet 
entered and order on Union Pacific's Motion. As such, Plaintiffs reliance upon Rule 4-
506 and the case law under that rule is misplaced. 
Moreover, although technically unnecessary under the rule, Plaintiff received all 
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notice to which he would have been entitled under Rule 4-506 upon service of the First 
Notice to Appear. Rule 5(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states: 
Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to 
be made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service 
shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party 
is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a 
party shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy 
to the last known address or, if no address is known, by 
leaving it with the clerk of the court. 
Union Pacific served the First Notice to Appear upon Plaintiffs attorney and upon 
Plaintiff at his last known address, which Plaintiff himself listed in his Complaint. If in 
fact Plaintiff wished to receive service at some other address, Plaintiff owed a duty to the 
court and Union Pacific to provide his new address at which he hopes to receive case 
related documents. Plaintiff cannot simply sit back and hope that Union Pacific will 
discover that Plaintiffs counsel included his new address on a mailing certificate. As 
such, Plaintiff received all notice to which he was entitled. To the extent Plaintiff did not 
receive actual notice of the notice to appear or appoint, it is to the Plaintiffs own neglect. 
As such, Plaintiff is in no position to complain that he did not receive the notices to 
appear where such failure is do to Plaintiffs own failure. 
2. Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because he did not 
exercise reasonable diligence and his failure to discover the judgment was not 
excusable neglect 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, 60(b) a court may grant a party relief from 
judgement if it is "in the furtherance of justice" and satisfies one of the following 
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conditions: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b); (3) fraud,... misrepresentation or other misconduct of 
an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. 
Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch-all provision that allows a court to set aside judgment for 
"any other reason" which is just. This requires the moving party to meet three conditions 
First, the reason for setting aside judgment must not fall under one of the first five 
categories. Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.. 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah App. 
1991). Second, the reason must justify relief. Id. Third, the motion must be made within 
a reasonable time after learning about the judgment. Id. However, Rule 60(b)(6) "should 
be very cautiously and sparingly invoked by the Court only in unusual and exceptional 
instances." Id (quoting Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1304, 1307-08 
(Utah 1982)).3 
Failure to receive notice does not automatically entitle a moving party to relief. 
Rather, the moving party must have "shown diligence in trying to determine whether 
This quote originally referred to subsection (7) of Rule 60(b). However, subsection (7) 
was renumbered as (6) as a result of the 1998 amendment eliminating one other ground 
for relief. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 60 (1998). 
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judgment had been entered" or actually have been "misled... as to whether there had 
been entry of judgment." Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 68 P.3d 1008, 1011 
(Utah App. 2003) (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 
60.48[6][c] (3d ed. 2002)). This is not one of the rare and exceptional cases in which 
Rule 60(b)(6) should be invoked because Plaintiffs motion more properly falls within the 
ambit of Rule 60(b)(1), the circumstances of this case do not justify relief, and Plaintiff 
failed to exercise reasonable diligence to determine whether the judgment had been 
entered. 
Rule 60(b)(6) does not apply because Plaintiffs grounds for relief are covered by 
(b)(1). Rule 60(b)(1) allows a court to grant relief if the moving party can show mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 60(b)(6) (emphasis 
added). As such, (b)(1) governs, and Plaintiff cannot recover because he cannot show 
that his failure to receive notice of the judgment was the result of excusable neglect. 
Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dept. 991 P.2d 607, 612 (Utah App. 1999). 
In Black's Title, supra, the petitioner, who was ill, was not staying at his normal 
residence and was only keeping minimal contacts with the business he owned. Id. at 609. 
During one of his few visits, the manager informed him that the respondent was 
investigating the business. Id. Shortly thereafter, the respondent initiated a suit against 
the petitioner and mailed the complaint to his home and his business address. Id. 
However, petitioner never received the complaint because he never requested his mail 
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from his business and he "made no effort to inform the [respondent] of his change in 
address." Id at 612. Because petitioner never received the complaint, he failed to 
respond and a default judgment was entered against him. Id. at 609. Upon learning 
about the judgment, petitioner sought to have it set aside under either 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6) 
because he never knew about it. Id. at 611. The court found that the petitioner should 
have known a suit was likely and checked his mail. Id. at 612. The court held that 
petitioner was not entitled to 60(b)(6) relief because his "lack of knowledge" was the 
result of his own inexcusable neglect and thus fell within the bounds of 60(b)(1). Id. As 
such, relief was not available under 60(b)(1) nor 60(b)(6). Id. 
Plaintiff cannot recover under (b)(1) or (b)(6) because his failure to receive notice 
is the result of his own inexcusable neglect. Having initially provided Union Pacific and 
the court with an address at which to contact him, Plaintiff never informed Union Pacific 
nor the court of his new address. As such, Union Pacific was forced to do its best to find 
Plaintiff. Despite Union Pacific's reasonable efforts, Plaintiff claims he never received 
this notice and thus claims he did not know that the judgment had been entered. Plaintiff 
argues that Union Pacific should have realized that his counsel included him on the 
certificate of mailing on Mr. Mueller's notice of withdrawal, and that that address was a 
changed address from the one on his Complaint. 
Obviously, had Union Pacific realized that Mr, Mueller had served the notice of 
withdrawal on Plaintiff, Union Pacific would have used that address. However, 
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Plaintiffs argument misses the point. Union Pacific served the First Notice to Appear on 
Plaintiff at the address Plaintiff provided Union Pacific and the Court to contact him. 
Plaintiff was well aware of his own change of address. Plaintiffs failure to give Union 
Pacific his new address while his suit against Union Pacific was still open in no way can 
be characterized as excusable neglect. 
Even more to the point, Plaintiff admits that he was advised that a judgment might 
be entered at any time and that the period in which to appeal would then begin. 
Nevertheless, Plaintiff chose not to contact the court again to inquire as to the status of 
the judgment for over four months. 
Even if subsection (b)(6) were applicable, Plaintiff still would not be entitled to 
have his judgment set aside because this is not a case where failure to receive notice 
would justify relief. Plaintiffs claimed failure to receive notice is entirely because he did 
not keep Union Pacific and the Court informed of how to contact him. 
Plaintiff relies heavily upon Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra, in 
support of his argument that failure to receive notice justifies 60(b)(6) relief. 68 P.3d 
1008. However, that case is factually distinguishable from plaintiffs case and thus does 
not support his argument. 
In Oseguera, one party filed a motion for summary judgment and the other party 
opposed the motion, but did not make a motion seeking summary judgment in its favor. 
Id. at 1008-09. Without hearing oral arguments, the court denied the moving party's 
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motion and then granted summary judgment for the non-moving party. Id. at 1011-12. 
The court did not tell the parties it intended to nor had entered judgment. Id Moreover, 
neither party had any reason to suspect judgment had been entered because the court still 
scheduled an oral argument. Id. As a result, the petitioner was not aware that judgment 
had been entered until it was too late. Id. at 1010. The court granted petitioner's 60(b)(6) 
motion based upon her failure to receive notice because she "had no reason to believe 
such a judgment could be forthcoming . . . and no reason to check periodically to see" if 
the judgment had been entered. Id. at 1012. 
Unlike Oseguerra, Plaintiff knew of the court's ruling and was expressly advised 
that judgment could be entered at any time. Nevertheless, Plaintiff did not call the court 
periodically between August and December. Moreover, any failure to receive notice was 
due to Plaintiffs own failure to advise Union Pacific and the court of his new address. 
Finally, Plaintiff is not entitled to Rule 60(b)(6) relief because he did not show 
reasonable diligence in trying to determine whether the judgment had been entered. 
Plaintiff only made three calls to the court. Plaintiff placed the first call in June, Mr. 
Peatross placed the second call on Plaintiffs behalf in August. Having been advised that 
judgment could be entered at any time, Plaintiff did not place a third call until December. 
Plaintiff easily could have and should have called the court every two to three weeks to 
determine whether or not the signed judgment had been issued. Had he done so, he 
would have learned of the judgment in time to file a timely notice. 
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Plaintiff attempts to compare himself to the petitioner in Tubbs v Campbell 731 
F.2d 1214,1215-16 (7th Cir. 1984). However, Tubbs is again factually distinguishable 
from this case. In Tubbs, the petitioner made inquiries to the court and the clerk told him 
that a judgment had not been entered when in fact it had. IdL Nothing in the Tubbs case 
suggests that waiting four months to inquire after having been advised that judgment 
could be entered constitutes reasonable diligence. In this case, Plaintiff was not mislead 
by the court's clerk, did not make reasonably diligent efforts to learn of the entry of 
judgment, and is therefore not entitled to relief. 
3, Rule 58A(d) does not appiy because Plaintiff failed to provide Union Pacific 
with an updated address. 
Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that "a copy of the signed 
judgment shall be promptly served" by the prevailing party. This rule expressly provides 
that the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement of this 
provision. Id. Further, a failure to comply with this provision does not invalidate the 
judgment; it is only one factor the court uses to analyze the timeliness of post-judgment 
proceedings. Workman v. Nagle Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah App. 
1990). If "a party has had notice of the judgment but has nevertheless remained idle in 
attacking i t . . . that lack of diligence is a strong reason not to disturb the judgment." 
Workman, 802 P.2d at 751. Constructive notice is enough to satisfy this requirement. 
See, Reeves v. Steinfeldt 915 P.2d 1073, 1077, n.6 (Utah App. 1996). A party to a 
lawsuit is deemed to have constructive notice of the contents of the court record. Id 
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Additionally, a litigant has a duty to stay informed about what the trial court is doing. Id. 
Thus, a party to a lawsuit may be deemed to have knowledge of a judgment even if the 
party has not received actual notice. See id. As Plaintiff notes, Section 58A(d) does not 
allow a party who knows judgment has been entered to take "advantage of a technical 
failure to serve judgment." Plaintiffs Brief, 8. 
In the present case, 58A(d) does not help Plaintiff. Union Pacific mailed Plaintiff 
a copy of the proposed judgment to the address it had been able to obtain for Plaintiff 
after learning that the only address Plaintiff provided was no longer valid. Plaintiff 
alleges that he did not receive the judgment, but he certainly had constructive knowledge 
that it had been entered because it was part of the court record after August 19, 2003. In 
addition, Plaintiff had a duty to keep himself informed of the case status, and had a clear 
means to do so. Despite this duty, he failed to maintain periodic contact with the court or 
Union Pacific. As a result, Plaintiff had constructive notice the judgment had been 
entered, and is not entitled to relief due to his claimed failure to receive actual notice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court uphold 
the trial court's denial of Plaintiff s Motion to Set Aside Judgment. 
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Dated this H day of November, 2004. 
Kent AV. Hansen 
Attorney for Union Pacific Railroad Co. 
20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J^ day of November, 2004, two true, correct and 
complete copies of the foregoing were served upon the following, in the manner so 
indicated: 
Richard Ranney 
Ranney & Peatross 
1722 East 280 North, Suite C2 
St. George, UT 84790 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
X U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight 
Facsimile 
No Service 
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